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PAYING FOR UNAPPROVED MEDICAL PRODUCTS
KELLY MCBRIDE FOLKERS,† ALISON BATEMANHOUSE,†† & CHRISTOPHER ROBERTSON†††

T

his symposium article examines the use of investigational (unapproved) medical products in the United States, with particular focus on who pays for this use. In the United States, the
question of who pays for the use of approved medical products for
their intended indications is complicated enough, with some expenses borne by private payers, some by public payers, some covered as charity care, and some paid out of pocket by patients. 1 A
separate question is off-label use, in which an approved medical
product is used for an unapproved indication. 2 In this article, we
focus on a narrower issue: what entities in the United States pay for
access to unapproved medical products, e.g., investigational drugs,
devices, or diagnostics that have not (yet) received Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) approval.
We examine the various forms of preapproval access
(“PAA”) to experimental medical products available in the United
States—clinical trials and non-trial preapproval access via the Expanded Access (“EA”) and Right to Try (“RTT”) pathways. For each,
this paper analyzes which entity—individual, insurer, sponsor, or

† Senior Research Associate, Division of Medical Ethics, NYU Grossman School of
Medicine.
†† Assistant Professor, Division of Medical Ethics, NYU Grossman School of Medicine and co-chair NYU Grossman School of Medicine Working Group on Compassionate
Use and Preapproval Access (CUPA).
††† N. Neal Pike Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University, and affiliate
with the NYU Grossman School of Medicine Working Group on Compassionate Use and
Pre-Approval Access (CUPA). This work was largely done while at University of Arizona,
and with the excellent research assistance of Andrea Sharp and the administrative support
of Bert Skye.
1. COMM. ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L
ACADS., HIDDEN COSTS, VALUES LOST: UNINSURANCE IN AMERICA 38 (2003), http://www.
nap.edu/catalog/10719.html.
2. Off-Label Drug Use, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, https://www.cancer.org/treatment/treatments-and-side-effects/treatment-types/off-label-drug-use.html (last revised Mar. 17, 2015).
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other—bears the cost and what limitations or caps, if any, exist on
these costs. This paper considers various proposed novel payment
mechanisms that may permit more equitable use of investigational
medical products.
This analysis grapples with the ongoing tension between the
desire to make access widely available to those for whom such products provide a last hope and the concern that allowing the purchase
of unapproved medical products in the same manner as approved
medical products likely would have negative consequences for individual patients, public health, payers, and those who support payers
through premiums and taxes, in a healthcare system already grappling with scarcity and inequity. 3
The vast majority of treatments-in-development ultimately
do not receive regulatory approval because they are determined via
clinical trials to be unsafe and/or ineffective. 4 Thus, the issue of
paying for investigational medical products is intertwined with both
the risk of harm to patients, which in turn can lead to expensive
follow-up care, and the risk of wasteful expenditure on products
that simply do not work. 5 Moreover, in a world of scarce resources,
it must be decided to what extent access to investigational medical
products is a priority worthy of the subsequent opportunity costs.
Also, if manufacturers are allowed to profit indefinitely from unapproved products without completing the pivotal trials necessary to
gain marketing authorization, the medical, payer, and patient communities may never learn whether the product is safe, effective, or
worth its price. 6 This has implications as well for future treatments,
which would likely be tested against the unproven product, a practice that has become standard of care in light of the lack of other
options.
Part I outlines payment-related disparities in access ingrained in the current United States healthcare system. Part II focuses on access in the context of clinical trials, which most payers

3. Unapproved Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 29, 2020), https://
www.fda.gov/drugs/enforcement-activities-fda/unapproved-drugs.
4. Joseph DiMasi, Pharmaceutical R&D Performance by Firm Size: Approval Success Rates
and Economic Returns, 21 AM. J. THERAPEUTICS 26, 26 (2014).
5. Gail A. Van Norman, Expanding Patient Access to Investigational Drugs: Single Patient
Investigational New Drug and the “Right to Try”, 3 J. AM. COLL. CARDIOLOGY 280, 288 (2018).
6. See Christopher Robertson & Victor Laurion, Tip of the Iceberg II: How the IntendedUses Principle Produces Medical Knowledge and Protects Liberty, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 770
(2017).
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have begun to cover, but where remaining uncovered expenses can
disincentivize participation in clinical trials, even among those
highly motivated to enroll. Part III discusses non-trial preapproval
access pathways, specifically Expanded Access and Right to Try,
where coverage is scant. Part IV briefly deals with investigational
products (such as stem cell treatments) that are available via unregulated or underregulated direct-to-consumer sales. Part V then reviews the ethical considerations inherent in paying for investigational medical products.

I.

THE U.S. HEALTHCARE SETTING

In the United States, prior to broad release of a new medical
product, a manufacturer must produce a reasonable amount of evidence about the product’s safety and efficacy and secure approval
by the FDA. 7 Thus, “unapproved” or “investigational” refers to products that the FDA has not approved for prescription, sale, and marketing. In most circumstances, patients access such medical products by participating in clinical trials. 8
However, for severely ill patients who are unable to join clinical trials and who have no other treatment options, use of these
products is available through a variety of access programs in many
countries. 9 These programs vary in detail, and they utilize different
terminologies, e.g., Expanded Access or Right to Try in the United
States; Special Access Program in Canada; and Temporary Authorisation for Use in France, among others. 10 Regardless of the terminologies, these mechanisms share a common goal of permitting seriously or terminally ill patients with no other therapeutic options
to use unapproved medical products in hopes of potential therapeutic benefit. 11
7. Christopher Robertson, When Truth Cannot be Presumed: The Regulation of Drug Promotion Under an Expanding First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 545, 547 (2014).
8. Compassionate Drug Use, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, https://www.cancer.org/trea
tment/treatments-and-side-effects/clinical-trials/compassionate-drug-use.html (last revised Nov. 19, 2018).
9. Id.
10. VANESSA PLATE, THE IMPACT OF OFF-LABEL, COMPASSIONATE AND UNLICENSED
USE ON HEALTH CARE LAWS IN PRESELECTED COUNTRIES 34 (2010).
11. See Gayarthri Balasubramanian et al., An Overview of Compassionate Use Programs in
the European Union Member States, 5 INTRACTABLE & RARE DISEASES RES. 244 (2016) (explaining programs in European Union member countries that allow patients to access drugs
without participating in clinical trials); Jonathan Jarow et al., Overview of FDA’s Expanded
Access Program for Investigational Drugs, 51 THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION & REG. SCI. 177 (2017)
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Patient demand for investigational medical products in the
United States has increased in the last several years, likely in response to heightened media and political attention to the topic,
coupled with widespread frustrations about access to medicines
even after regulatory approval and longstanding perceptions by
some that drug development is too slow and insufficiently patientcentric. 12
We focus on the United States, where access to healthcare is
fundamentally unequitable. For example, recent news reports detail situations in which patients have been denied transplants due
to concerns that they cannot afford post-transplant medications
necessary to prevent rejection of the donated organ; 13 patients are
unable to afford the ongoing expense of insulin and ration it at the
risk of death or other preventable harm; 14 and patients are discharged even though continued hospitalization is warranted. 15
Healthcare coverage in the United States is fragmented,
with the largest group of Americans insured through their employers’ contracts with private payers. 16 Americans who receive publiclyfunded insurance do so primarily through two programs: Medicare
(intended primarily for individuals over the age of sixty-five) and
Medicaid (intended primarily for low-income individuals). 17
There have been numerous proposals for achieving universal insurance coverage, either through a single-payer system or a
(describing the FDA’s Expanded Access program, which allows patients to access unapproved drugs without participating in clinical trials); Laura L. Kimberly et al., Pre-approval
Access Terminology: A Cause for Confusion and a Danger to Patients, 51 THERAPEUTIC
INNOVATION & REG. SCI. 494 (2017) (clarifying terms); Eline M. Bunnik et al., Little to Lose
and No Other Options: Ethical Issues in Efforts to Facilitate Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs,
122 HEALTH POL’Y 977 (2018) (surveying issues).
12. Kelly Folkers et al., Federal Right to Try: Where is it Going?, 49 HASTINGS CTR. REP.
26, 29 (2019).
13. JoNel Aleccia, No Cash, No Heart. Transplant Centers Require Proof of Payment, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (Dec. 5, 2018), https://khn.org/news/no-cash-no-heart-transplant-centersrequire-proof-of-payment.
14. Ed Silverman, One-Quarter of People with Diabetes in the U.S. are Rationing Their Insulin, STATNEWS (June 18, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2019/06/18/onequarter-of-people-with-diabetes-in-the-u-s-are-rationing-their-insulin.
15. MARTIN CASTRO ET AL., U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PATIENT DUMPING iv (2014),
https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/docs/2014PATDUMPOSD_9282014-1.pdf.
16. EDWARD R. BERCHICK ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE
IN THE UNITED STATES: 2017 2 (2018), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2018/demo/p60-264.pdf.
17. James McWhinney, Medicare vs. Medicaid: What’s the Difference?, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr.
15, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/pf/07/medicare-vs-medicaid.asp.
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public option. 18 Yet, even with recent increases in coverage, many
Americans remain uninsured or underinsured. 19 According to the
most recent data issued by the United States Census Bureau in 2017,
approximately 28.5 million individuals remain uninsured. 20 Approximately 43.8 million individuals are underinsured, meaning
their insurance plans are inadequate to cover the medical products
and services they need. 21 Instances in which insured patients are denied access to high-cost, but approved, treatments, such as gene
therapies, have increasingly come to light. 22 Thus, access to unapproved products, where safety and efficacy have not been proven,
must be seen in the light of these broader scarcities and inequities. 23

II.

CLINICAL TRIALS

Clinical trials are studies of interventions to ascertain reliable information about their safety and efficacy in treating a particular indication. 24 Human trials of new medical products proceed
through three phases, from small studies to determine appropriate
dosage levels, to larger, often randomized, studies of patients with
the disease needing treatment. 25 In some Phase I studies, research
subjects are healthy volunteers, and their participation is typically
financially compensated. 26 But for most trials, participants are

18. Margot Sanger-Katz, The Difference Between a ‘Public Option’ and ‘Medicare for All’?
Let’s Define our Terms, THE N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/upshot/medicare-for-all-health-terms-sanders.html.
19. BERCHICK ET AL., supra note 16, at 1.
20. Id. at 1.
21. Sara R. Collins et al., Health Insurance Coverage Eight Years After the ACA,
COMMONWEALTH FUND (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/ publications/issue-briefs/2019/feb/health-insurance-coverage-eight-years-after-aca. See generally
CHRISTOPHER T. ROBERTSON, EXPOSED: WHY OUR HEALTH INSURANCE IS INCOMPLETE AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2019).
22. James Paton, Gene Therapy Was Hailed as a Revolution. Then Came the Bill,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 7, 2019, 9:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-0407/gene-therapy-was-hailed-as-a-revolution-then-came-the-bill.
23. Holly Fernandez Lynch & Alison Bateman-House, Facilitating Both Evidence and Access: Improving FDA’s Accelerated Approval and Expanded Access Pathways, 48 J.L Med. & Ethics
365 (2020).
24. Clinical Trials: What are Clinical Trials and Studies?, NAT’L INST. ON AGING (Apr. 9,
2020), https://www.nia.nih.gov/health/what-are-clinical-trials-and-studies.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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patients who fit the eligibility criteria of a specific study with regard
to disease or condition. 27
Patients sometimes view participation in a clinical trial as a
way to receive medical treatment; 28 however, the primary intent of
clinical research is to learn about a new medical product and to
evaluate its safety and efficacy in a specific patient population, rather than to provide treatment. 29 Even in the case of a negative finding, the trial contributes to scientific knowledge, provided the trial
data and results are made public. This mix of possible individual
benefit and societal benefit plays a role in how clinical trial-related
expenses will be covered. 30

A. Sponsors
In the United States, pharmaceutical or biotechnology companies sponsor the majority of clinical trials. 31 The trial sponsor often covers the costs of the investigational product and trial-required
interventions and makes them available free of charge to the research subject/patient. 32 The sponsor’s trial budget includes the
provider and facilities fees for study-required visits or tests, along
with any incentive payments or reimbursements trial participants
may receive. 33 However, not all clinical trials involve experimental
agents. A trial might test various approved drugs or combinations
of approved drugs; in these cases, patients’ insurers may pay costs
the sponsor does not cover, as use of these drugs is part of standard
medical care, despite their delivery in the context of a trial. 34 Expenses resulting from the trial that are not part of the trial

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Paying for Clinical Trials, ONCOLINK (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.oncolink.org/cancer-treatment/clinical-trials/paying-for-clinical-trials.
31. Michelle Llamas, Big Pharma’s Role in Clinical Trials, DRUGWATCH (May 14, 2019),
https://www.drugwatch.com/featured/clinical-trials-and-hidden-data.
32. Clinical Trials: Sponsors and Sponsor-investigators, MARS (Oct. 17, 2012),
https://learn.marsdd.com/article/clinical-trials-sponsors-and-sponsor-investigators.
33. Kunal Sampat, Ultimate Guide to Clinical Trial Costs, CLINICAL TRIAL PODCAST (Jan.
21, 2017), https://clinicaltrialpodcast.com/ultimate-guide-to-clinical-trial-costs.
34. Insurance Coverage of Clinical Trials, AM. SOC’Y OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY,
https://www.asco.org/research-guidelines/clinical-trials/insurance-coverage-clinical-trials
(last visited June 12, 2020).
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protocol—for example, research-related injuries—are handled inconsistently. 35
Aside from what sponsors may pay, another question is what
they may charge patients for participation in a clinical trial. Since
1987, clinical trial sponsors have been permitted to charge patients
for the provision of investigational medical products provided under an investigational new drug application (“IND”), but these costs
can only include direct costs of manufacturing, shipping, and/or
handling. 36
Sponsors of INDs must request authorization from the FDA
to charge for the use of an investigational medical product under
that IND. 37 The FDA subsequently determines whether the sponsor
may charge, but the agency does not determine how to carry out this
charging. 38 Specifically for clinical trials, sponsors must provide evidence to the FDA that the investigational medical product under
its IND has potential clinical benefit that, if demonstrated, would
provide significant advantages for patients; that the data obtained
from the trial is necessary for the product’s approval submission
and/or label expansion; and that the sponsor cannot conduct the
clinical trial without charging. 39 The sponsor must also provide a
document to the FDA that supports its calculation for cost recovery,
and an independent certified public accountant must verify the accuracy of the calculations. 40 Finally, sponsors can charge for
35. Carolyn Riley Chapman et al., The Quest for Compensation for Research-Related Injury
in the United States: A New Proposal, 47 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 732, 732 (2019).
36. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., CHARGING FOR
INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS UNDER AN IND — QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY 8 (June 2016) https://www.fda.gov/media/85682/download [hereinafter
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY]. Under federal law, investigational new drugs cannot be shipped
across state lines. Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(Jan. 22, 2020) https://www.fda.gov/drugs/types-applications/investigational-new-drugind-application. Since sponsors of clinical trials will likely want to ship their product across
state lines for the purposes of setting up additional trial sites, they must apply for an exemption to this federal requirement. Id. An investigational new drug application (IND) allows
sponsors to ship investigational medical products across state lines and serves as a legal exemption to the federal regulations surrounding interstate commerce of investigational
medical products. Id.
37. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 36, at 2.
38. Id. at 3. For example, a sponsor may contract with a third party or contract research organization that administers the trial or expanded access program. In this case, the
FDA does not have authority to determine how that third party carries out charging patients. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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“extraordinary costs” if there are such factors like manufacturing
complexity, scarcity of a necessary natural resource needed to produce the investigational medical product, a large quantity of product needed, or some combination of these circumstances. 41
More recently, there has been a gradual introduction of socalled “pay-to-play” (or, more neutrally, “participant-funded”) trials, in which the trial-related costs are borne by the research participant instead of a sponsor. 42 The U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Human Research
Protections (“SACHRP”) recently released a series of recommendations on pay-to-play studies. 43 These recommendations suggested that sponsors avoid charging participants but provide guidance and ethical considerations for doing so when there are
legitimate reasons. 44 Others have commented on the ethical permissibility, or in some cases obligation, to reimburse and/or compensate clinical trial participants for completing a study. 45

B. Patients/Caregivers
While most clinical trials provide investigational medicines
for free, some may charge patients for ancillary costs, including office visits, lab tests, and imaging, which the patients’ insurance—if
they are insured—may or may not cover. 46 Patients or their caregivers may incur trial-related expenses, particularly for such costs as
travel, parking, lodging, childcare, etc. 47 These issues have received
increased attention in recent years. SACHRP produced guidance
clarifying that such payments are ethically appropriate and do not

41. Id. at 4.
42. Rebecca Robbins, Amid Rising Concern, Pay-to-Play Clinical Trials are Drawing Federal
Scrutiny, STATNEWS (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/08/06/amid-risingconcern-pay-to-play-clinical-trials-are-drawing-federal-scrutiny.
43. Attachment A - Addressing Ethical Concerns Regarding Offers of Payment to Research Participants, HHS, https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp-committee/recommendations/attachment-a-september-30-2019/index.html (last reviewed Oct. 2019).
44. Id.
45. Emily Largent & Holly Fernandez Lynch, Paying Research Participants: The Outsized
Influence of “Undue Influence”, 39 IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES. 1, 1 (2017).
46. Insurance Coverage and Clinical Trials, NAT’L CANCER INST. (Feb. 6, 2020),
https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/treatment/clinical-trials/paying/insurance.
47. Anna Lee, Kanan Shah & Fumiko Chino, Assessment of Parking Fees at National Cancer Institute–Designated Cancer Treatment Centers, JAMA ONCOLOGY (forthcoming 2020); Calculating the Costs of Clinical Trials, ASH CLINICAL NEWS (Dec. 1, 2019), https://www.ashclinicalnews.org/spotlight/feature-articles/calculating-costs-clinical-trials.
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constitute undue manipulation of research subjects. 48 Well-funded
pharmaceutical companies may cover these ancillary expenses, including logistical costs like travel and lodging, as part of the overall
cost of conducting a clinical trial, but small pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies cover these costs less frequently. 49
In contrast to trials initiated by biopharmaceutical companies, another category of trials is “investigator-initiated research.” 50
In such cases, where physician-scientists run their own trials, researchers may be able to get the investigational product paid for by
research funding or donated by its manufacturer, but incidental
costs are even less likely to be covered. 51
When patients are exposed to trial costs, those expenses may
prevent patients who would be inclined to participate from doing
so. 52 In the field of oncology, scholars have defined “financial toxicity” as the phenomenon of healthcare costs causing stress, bankruptcy, and worse health outcomes for patients. 53 Recently, scholars
have focused this concept on clinical trials in particular, arguing
that financial exposures may be one reason that clinical trials tend
to disproportionately enroll whiter and wealthier populations, excluding those less able to pay trial-related expenses out of pocket. 54
Some patients call upon others to assist with trial-related expenses. A case in point is that of Lily, “a bright and bubbly 13 year
old” in England, whose family is seeking to enroll her in a United
States-based clinical trial in Seattle, Washington. 55 According to a
“crowdfunding”—the practice of soliciting a large number of small

48. Attachment A - Addressing Ethical Concerns Regarding Offers of Payment to Research Participants, HHS, https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp-committee/recommendations/attachment-a-september-30-2019/index.html (last reviewed Oct. 2019).
49. Amit Pratap Singh Rathore, Getting a Handle on Clinical Trial Costs, CLINICAL
LEADER (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.clinicalleader.com/doc/getting-a-handle-on-clinicaltrial-costs-0001.
50. R. Romanchuk, The Noble Pursuit of Investigator-Initiated Research, ADVARRA (June 19,
2019), https://www.advarra.com/investigator-initiated-research.
51. Id.
52. Clinical Trials for Cancer Patients, GOFUNDME (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.gofundme.com/c/blog/clinical-trials-cancer-patients.
53. Fumiko Chino & S. Yousuf Zafar, Financial Toxicity and Equitable Access to Clinical
Trials, 39 ASCO EDUC. BOOK 11 (2019).
54. Id.
55. Ellis Whitehouse, Lily Wythe Gets 300k in Donations Thanks to One Pound Warriors
Campaign, ECHONEWS (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.echo-news.co.uk/news/18184265.lilywythe-gets-300k-donations-thanks-one-pound-warriors-campaign.
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donations from individuals on the Internet 56—campaign established for Lily on November 18, 2019, “a years [sic] treatment in the
US . . . will cost around £300,000. This includes the cost of the trial,
accommodation, flights and medical treatment she may need while
she’s there.” 57 As a resident of Great Britain, Lily likely would not
qualify for publicly funded insurance in the United States; thus, it
would fall to her parents to either obtain private insurance (either
by purchasing it or via an employer) or to pay for her expenses
themselves. 58

C. Private Payers
Based on contracts and policy documents, payers have historically excluded coverage for investigational treatments. 59 Insurers typically require data supporting the use of a therapy, and FDA’s
premarket approval of labeled indications serves as the primary way
to satisfy that need. 60
Currently, thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia
have laws or agreements that require private insurers to cover the
routine costs of clinical trial participation. 61 Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”), private insurers
must cover certain trial-related expenses that sponsors do not
cover. 62 The ACA requires group health plans or health insurance
issuers offering group or individual health insurance coverage to
cover routine costs associated with clinical trial participation if the
coverage is consistent with what would typically be provided to qualified individuals who are not enrolled in a trial. 63 Under the law,
56. See Snyder & Caufield, infra note 140. See generally Irma Borst et al., From Friendfunding to Crowdfunding: Relevance of Relationships, Social Media, and Platform Activities to Crowdfunding Performance, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y. 1396 (2018).
57. Id.
58. Public or Subsidized Health Insurance, SMALL BUS. MAJORITY, https://healthcoverageguide.org/reference-guide/coverage-types/public-or-subsidized-health-insurance (last
visited May 25, 2020); Amy Fontelle, Buying Private Health Insurance, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 16,
2020), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/pf/08/private-health-insurance.asp.
59. Won Bok Lee, Recalibrating “Experimental Treatment Exclusion”: An Empirical Analysis,
83 U. CIN. L. REV. 171, 172–73 (2014).
60. Rebecca Dresser & Joel Frader, Off-Label Prescribing: A Call for Heightened Professional
and Government Oversight, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 476, 477 (2009).
61. Insurance Coverage of Clinical Trials, AM. SOC’Y OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY,
https://www.asco.org/research-guidelines/clinical-trials/insurance-coverage-clinical-trials
(last visited May 23, 2020).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-8 (2018).
63. Id.
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insurers cannot deny or otherwise alter coverage for a beneficiary
that is participating in a clinical trial. Further, the ACA prevents insurers from denying the beneficiary coverage of routine costs for
items and services associated with the trial. 64 ACA coverage includes
Phase I, II, III, and IV (post-approval) clinical trials conducted in
relation to the prevention, detection, or treatment of cancer or
other life-threatening diseases, in which death is expected without
an interruption in the course of the disease. 65

D. Medicare
Medicare, the federal health insurance program for people
sixty-five and older, younger people with disabilities, and those with
end-stage renal disease, began covering the routine costs of qualifying clinical trials in 2000. 66 Medicare considers “routine costs” to
comprise all items and services generally available to Medicare beneficiaries that are provided in this context to diagnose, treat, and
monitor complications arising from participation in clinical trials. 67
Though Medicare will not cover the costs of investigational items
and services themselves, it will cover items and services typically provided to beneficiaries absent participation in a clinical trial that are
associated with the provision of the investigational treatment, intended to monitor or prevent complications, or needed for the
“necessary and reasonable” care arising from the provision of an
investigational treatment. 68
Medicare does not cover any item or service that would otherwise be statutorily prohibited. 69 For example, Medicare generally
does not cover long-term nursing care at home; as such, Medicare
would not cover this service for a patient participating in a clinical

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Medicare Program – General Information, CMS https://www.cms.gov/index.php/Medicare/Medicare-General-Information/MedicareGenInfo/index (last modified Nov. 13, 2019); Medicare Clinical Trial Policies, CMS, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coverage/ClinicalTrialPolicies/index?redirect=/ClinicalTrialPolicies (last modified
Mar. 27, 2020).
67. National Coverage Determination (NCD) for Routine Costs in Clinical Trials (310.1), CMS
(July
9,
2007),
https://www.cms.gov/medicare-coverage-database/details/ncd-details.aspx?NCDId=1&ncdver=2&fromdb=true.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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trial. 70 For a clinical trial to qualify for Medicare coverage for participant expenses, the investigational intervention must fall under a
Medicare benefit category; the trial must have “therapeutic intent;”
and it must enroll patients diagnosed with a disease (i.e., not
healthy volunteers). 71 For a clinical trial to qualify for Medicare coverage, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality must convene a panel with representatives from multiple Department of
Health and Human Services agencies to develop qualifying criteria
that will indicate a strong probability that the trial will meet certain
desirable characteristics. 72 These characteristics include the extent
to which there is available scientific evidence supporting the rationale for the trial and whether the trial’s primary goal is to test if
the investigational intervention improves health outcomes. 73 Recently, Medicare coverage of clinical trial costs has become more
difficult to obtain due to increased standards for analyzing the effectiveness of an investigational intervention. 74
Though Medicare Part A (hospital coverage) and Part B
(medical coverage) pay for a majority of these costs, beneficiaries
will likely have to pay some out-of-pocket expenses. 75 Co-insurance
for patients is capped at twenty percent of the Medicare-approved
amount, and a patient’s Part B deductible may apply. 76
Available data suggests that Medicare expansion of coverage
for trial-related expenses significantly increased the number of clinical trial participants ages sixty-five and older, which was an intended effect of the policy change. 77 However, Medicare beneficiaries that also had supplemental insurance were more likely to
observe this impact, likely because basic Medicare exposes patients
to substantial copayments, even on clinical trial expenses. 78
70. Does Medicare Pay for Nursing Homes?, AARP (2020), https://www.aarp.org/
health/medicare-qa-tool/current-long-term-nursing-home-coverage.
71. See National Coverage Determination (NCD) for Routine Costs in Clinical Trials (310.1),
supra note 67.
72. Medicare Clinical Trial Policies, supra note 66.
73. Id.
74. James D. Chambers et al., Medicare Is Scrutinizing Evidence More Tightly For National
Coverage Determinations, 34 HEALTH AFF. 253, 253–60 (2015).
75. Clinical Research Studies, MEDICARE, https://www.medicare.gov/coverage/clinicalresearch-studies (last visited May 23, 2020).
76. Id.
77. Joseph M. Unger et al., Impact of the Year 2000 Medicare Policy Change on Older Patient
Enrollment to Cancer Clinical Trial, 24 J. OF CLINICAL ONCOL. 141, 141–44 (2006).
78. Id.
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E. Medicaid
Unlike Medicare and private insurance, Medicaid is not uniformly required to pay for certain types of trial-related expenses. 79
Rather, Medicaid policies with regard to such expenses are currently left to the discretion of the states. 80 Only ten states and the
District of Columbia cover clinical trial participation costs for Medicaid beneficiaries, effectively leaving many Medicaid patients unable to participate in clinical research if at least some costs are not
covered by the research sponsor. 81 Congress has looked at this issue,
but has not yet passed any legislation. If enacted, the Clinical Treatment Act would guarantee coverage of the routine care costs of clinical trial participation for Medicaid enrollees with a life-threatening
condition. 82 There are a large number of medical entities supporting this legislation, including the American Medical Association,
the American Cancer Society Cancer Action Network, Friends of
Cancer Research, and the American Society of Clinical Oncology. 83

F. Overall
Despite efforts on the part of many stakeholders to make access to clinical trials more equitable, United States trial participants
are likely to be affluent, white, and male. 84 Legal reform is one
mechanism of change, yet analyses of state coverage policies have
found mixed results on its impact in clinical trial enrollment. 85 An
analysis of clinical trial enrollment rates between 1996 and 2001
showed a statistically significant increase in Phase II cancer trial participation, but not in Phase III. 86 Another analysis found little

79. Health Insurance Coverage of Clinical Trials, CANCER.NET (Oct. 2018), https://
www.cancer.net/research-and-advocacy/clinical-trials/health-insurance-coverage-clinicaltrials.
80. Id.
81. See Chino & Zafar, supra note 53.
82. Clinical Treatment Act, H.R. 913, 116th Cong. (2019).
83. Community Endorsement Letter (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.asco.org/sites/newwww.asco.org/files/content-files/blog-release/pdf/2019-clinical-treatment-act-community-support-letter.pdf.
84. Natalie Jacewicz, Why Are Health Studies So White?, THE ATLANTIC (Jun. 16, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/06/why-are-health-studies-sowhite/487046.
85. See generally Cary P. Gross et al., Cancer Trial Enrollment After State-Mandated Reimbursement, 96 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1063 (2004).
86. Id.
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impact of state-mandated insurance coverage on the enrollment of
National Cancer Institute Community Clinical Oncology Programs,
a mainly non-academic cohort of hospital and oncology practices
that aim for community-based recruitment in trials. 87 After the passage of the ACA, insurance coverage for early-phase clinical trials
increased for those with private insurance, but there was no change
for Medicare or Medicaid insurance holders, who tend to be less
affluent. 88 According to another study, insurance denials persisted
in cancer clinical trials in recent years, with 62.7 percent of cancer
research centers and community-based institutions responding
that, at least once in 2014, insurance had been denied to patients
seeking clinical trials. 89

III.

EXPANDED ACCESS AND RIGHT TO TRY

If a patient has exhausted all approved treatment options
and is not eligible to participate in a clinical trial, there are two
other pathways in the United States for use of an investigational
medical product: Expanded Access and Right to Try (which are together sometimes called, “non-trial preapproval access”). 90 Both
mechanisms allow for a patient, through a physician, to request the
use of an investigational product from the IND-holder (typically a
drug company). 91 To qualify for either pathway, patients must have
a serious (under EA) or life-threatening (under EA and RTT) disease or condition and be ineligible to participate in a clinical trial
for the product they wish to use. 92 However, there are significant
differences between the two pathways in terms of eligibility, oversight, and what type of medical product may be sought. 93 For either

87. Shellie D. Ellis et al., Effect of State-Mandated Insurance Coverage on Accrual to Community Cancer Clinical Trials, 33 CONTEMP. CLINICAL TRIALS 933, 933–38 (2012).
88. Kenneth L. Kehl et al., Insurance Clearance for Early-Phase Oncology Clinical Trials
Following the Affordable Care Act, 23 CLINICAL CANCER RES. 4155, 4161 (2017).
89. Christine B. Mackay et al., Insurance Denials for Cancer Clinical Trial Participation
After the Affordable Care Act Mandate, 123 CANCER 2893, 2893–95 (2017).
90. Food and Drug Administration, Expanded Access, https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/public-health-focus/expanded-access; Food and Drug Administration, Right to Try,
https://www.fda.gov/patients/learn-about-expanded-access-and-other-treatment-options/right-try; see Carolyn Riley Chapman et al., Oversight of Right‐to‐Try and Expanded Access
Requests for Off‐Trial Access to Investigational Drugs, 42 IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES. 2 (2020).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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pathway, ancillary and/or direct costs to use experimental products
often are the responsibility of the patient.

A. Expanded Access
The FDA’s EA pathway, which has existed formally since
1987, allows for single patients or groups of patients to use unapproved investigational treatments outside of clinical trials. 94 Single
patients, via their physician, can request the use of an investigational product by identifying a product of interest and making a
request to the company or other entity (e.g., academic) developing
it. 95 If the IND-holder agrees, the FDA reviews the proposed treatment plan for medical feasibility and a favorable risk/benefit ratio
and ensures that the patient is not eligible to participate in a clinical
trial. 96 The FDA prioritizes clinical trial participation so that patient
usage of investigational medical products may result, through the
study, in generalizable knowledge to be used in determining marketing authorization, thereby benefiting future patients. 97 While
the agency may alter the proposal, for example, by adjusting dosage
or planned safety monitoring, the FDA allows more than ninetynine percent of these requests to proceed. 98 Except in cases of emergencies, the plan and a consent form must also receive approval by
an authorized institutional review board (“IRB”) before treatment
of the patient. 99
In addition to accommodating individual patients, the FDA
allows sponsors to create cohort expanded access programs, in
which a larger number of patients (even up to thousands) may receive an unapproved product. 100 As with the individual patient requests, there needs to be determination that the proposed treatment offers a higher chance of benefit than risk; that there are no

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Food and Drug Administration, supra note 90.
97. Jonathan P. Jarow et al., Overview of FDA’s Expanded Access Program for Investigational
Drugs, 51 THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION & REG. SCI. 177, 177–78 (2017).
98. Chapman et al., supra note 90.
99. Jonathan P. Jarow et al., Expanded Access of Investigational Drugs: The Experience of the
Center of Drug Evaluation and Research Over a 10-Year Period, 50 THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION &
REG. SCI. 705, 705–9 (2016).
100. Kelly McBride Folkers et al., Patient advocacy organizations’ information for patients on
pre-approval access to investigational treatments, 12 BMC RES. NOTES 1, 1–3 (2019).
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approved options suitable for these patients; and there is no capability to participate in a clinical trial. 101
Although patients who receive unapproved medical products via EA are not considered research subjects, and the effort being made on their behalf is considered therapy rather than research, sponsors must collect safety data and report serious or
unanticipated adverse events to the FDA. 102 There is increasing interest in collecting efficacy or endpoint data from expanded access,
although the value of this endeavor and how to do it without crossing the line into research remain to be sorted. 103 Nevertheless, the
hope of generating “real world data” for a product—from a wider
population than that enrolled in the product’s clinical trials—of interest to regulators or payers may incentivize sponsors to offer expanded access.
Similar to the previously described regulations on charging
for investigational medical products under an IND for clinical trials,
sponsors that make their products available through the FDA’s EA
pathway cannot charge patients a profit; charging is limited to the
direct costs of manufacturing and shipping the medical product
and expenses related to monitoring and collecting safety data. 104
Companies submit these cost calculations to the FDA for review before they can commence charging. 105
Notwithstanding the legal permissibility of recovering some
costs, most biopharmaceutical companies that provide investigational products through EA do so at no cost to the patient. 106 Companies are unlikely to charge for investigational products prior to
regulatory approval, to reduce public scrutiny of the market price,
which will likely be significantly higher than the direct cost of manufacturing the drug, as revealed by the EA price. 107 Yet even free
provision of drugs can also be problematic. After the approval of
101. Jarow et al., supra note 99, at 705–6.
102. Elena Fountzilas et al., Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs: Balancing Patient
Safety with Potential Therapeutic Benefits, 27 EXPERT OP. ON INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS 155, 155–
60 (2018).
103. Kate Rawson, Expanded Access Data Can Support Approval Decisions, US FDA Says, PINK
SHEET
(Nov.
21,
2018),
https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/
PS124296/Expanded-Access-Data-Can-Support-Approval-Decisions-US-FDA-Says.
104. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 36, at 7–8.
105. See generally id. at 7–8.
106. Jonathan J. Darrow et al., Practical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in Expanded Access to
Investigational Drugs, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 279, 281 (Jan. 15, 2015).
107. Id.
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Firdapse, a drug used to treat a rare neuromuscular disorder, the
company set the price at $375,000 annually. 108 Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) sent a letter to the company asking for its justification for
the price, as the drug had been available to patients for free via
EA. 109
Third-parties may sponsor EA programs. WideTrial, a San
Francisco-based company, announced a program last year in which
it will sponsor and manage EA programs for treatment use of an
agent Oncotelic, Inc. is developing. 110 The FDA approved WideTrial’s cost recovery program for a cell-based therapy aimed at treating critical limb ischemia. 111 WideTrial collects data from those who
participate in the EA program and sells back this data to the company. 112 The effect on patient costs could be higher, lower, or the
same as if the sponsor ran an EA a program itself.
Such recent efforts to find ways for companies to avoid absorbing the cost of providing investigational medical products via
EA have developed due to increased awareness of the divide between well-capitalized companies that have money to devote to EArelated expenses and smaller or undercapitalized companies that
do not. Pharmaceutical giants such as Novartis and Johnson & Johnson have publicly reported that they fulfill the vast majority of EA
requests they receive, and they do not charge for these products in
the United States. 113 In contrast, many small companies cite expense as a primary reason for not providing their products via EA. 114
Given this problem, there is renewed interest, among some, in
108. Letter from Bernie Sanders, Senator, U.S. Senate, to Patrick J. McEnany, President
and Chief Executive Officer of Catalyst Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Feb. 4, 2019),
https://www.sanders.senate.gov/download/letter-to-catalyst?inline=file.
109. See generally id.
110. WideTrial Partners with Oncotelic to Bring Expanded Access Platform to Cancer, BIOSPACE
(Jun. 3, 2019), https://www.biospace.com/article/widetrial-partners-with-oncotelic-tobring-expanded-access-platform-to-cancer.
111. Pluristem Therapeutics, Inc., U.S. FDA Approves Cost Recovery for PLX-PAD under Expanded Access Program in the Treatment of Critical Limb Ischemia, GLOBENEWSWIRE (Oct. 16,
2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2018/10/16/1621762/0/
en/U-S-FDA-Approves-Cost-Recovery-for-PLX-PAD-under-Expanded-Access-Program-inthe-Treatment-of-Critical-Limb-Ischemia.html.
112. Chris Rauber, This Man Proposes a Win-Win for Patients and Pharma, BIZ JOURNALS
(May 31, 2018), https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2018/05/31/this-manproposes-a-win-win-for-patients-pharma.html.
113. Steve Usdin, FDA to Facilitate Access to Unapproved Drugs, BIOCENTURY (Dec. 14,
2018), https://www.biocentury.com/article/299854/how-fda-plans-to-help-patients-get-expanded-access-to-unapproved-drugs.
114. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 36, at 4.

ROBERTSON_TOPUBLISH (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

102

WAKE FOREST JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY

10/9/20208:00 PM

[Vol. 11:1

having insurance companies cover the costs of investigational products used via EA. 115

B. Right to Try
Enacted in May 2018, the Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2017
sought to streamline access to investigational medical products by
eliminating FDA review and IRB approval of single patient requests. 116 The Right to Try Act—which, rather than replacing EA,
co-exists with it as another pathway to non-trial access—received significant political support from President Donald Trump and Vice
President Mike Pence. 117 The Goldwater Institute, a libertarian organization, developed the concept and first sought to have RTT
laws enacted on the state level. 118 Indeed, forty-one states now have
their own versions of these laws, creating complexity across jurisdictions to the extent that federal law does not impliedly preempt
them. 119
Several patient groups have expressed frustration that larger
numbers of patients have not gained access to investigational treatments through the federal Right to Try Act. 120 Although no centralized authoritative accounting exists as of this writing, it appears that
there have been fewer than ten public reports of patients receiving
access to an investigational medical product through the federal

115. Peter J. Pitts, It’s Time to Get Serious About the Economics of Expanded Access,
STATNEWS (Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/01/30/get-serious-economics-expanded-access.
116. See generally Right to Try Act, Pub. L. No. 115-176, § 204, 132 Stat. 1372 (2018).
117. Angela LaVito, Trump Signs ‘Right-to-Try’ Allowing Gravely Ill Patients to Bypass FDA
for Experimental Medicines, CNBC (May 30, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/30/
trump-signs-right-to-try-legislation-on-experimental-medicines.html.
118. Zoe Carpenter, The ‘Right-to-Try’ Unproven Pharmaceuticals is a Right-Wing Scheme,
THE NATION (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/the-right-to-tryunproven-pharmaceuticals-is-a-right-wing-scheme.
119. Jann Bellamy, “Right to Try” Laws Create Tremendous Legal Uncertainties; FDA Expanded Access Preferable, SCI.-BASED MED. (Jan. 17, 2019), https://sciencebasedmedicine.org/right-to-try-laws-create-tremendous-legal-uncertainties-fda-expanded-access-preferable.
120. See generally Nicholas Florko, A Year After Trump Touted ‘Right to Try,’ Patients Still
Aren’t
Getting
Treatment,
STATNEWS
(Jan.
29,
2019),
https://www.statnews.com/2019/01/29/right-to-try-patients-still-arent-getting-treatment.
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Right to Try Act. 121 A number of patients obtained access to one
product under the Texas Right to Try Act before the passage of the
federal law. 122 In all reported instances to date, it appears the requested product could have been provided under EA, and the rationale for using RTT is unclear. 123
With regard to costs, the federal RTT statute cites some of
the same regulations that apply in the EA context, prohibiting companies from charging more than the direct cost of manufacturing a
drug. 124 Yet there are important differences in oversight. The law
does not specify who pays for experimental therapies, nor does it
specify which entity ensures that these cost calculations are accurate. 125 Thus, patients could bear the costs of paying for the intervention and related costs under RTT. Furthermore, the stated “direct costs” might also be inflated or otherwise adjusted.
Most of the forty-one state RTT laws provide that patients may
incur the cost of using an investigational product. 126 However, four
state RTT laws have odd and worrisome provisions, which not only
allow insurers to exclude coverage for products obtained via RTT,
but go further to allow insurers to altogether revoke health insurance coverage for patients undergoing treatment with an experimental therapy. 127 Insurance companies can deny coverage for as
long as six months after the experimental treatment ends. 128 These
provisions could jeopardize health insurance coverage for those
who receive investigational treatments.

121. Mike Riggs, Trump’s ‘Right to Try’ Law Has Helped at Least Two People So Far. Give
Credit Where It’s Due., REASON (Feb. 5, 2019, 10:35 PM), https://reason.com/2019/02/05/give-credit-where-its-due-at-least-one-p.
122. Zachary Brennan, Who’s Actually Using ‘Right-To-Try’ Laws? A Texas Oncologist Explains His Experience, RAPS (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.raps.org/ regulatory-focus™/newsarticles/2017/8/who-s-actually-using-right-to-try-laws-a-texas-oncologist-explains-his-experience.
123. See generally Jen Uscher, Expanded Access and Right to Try: Alternative Paths to Experimental Treatments for Metastatic Breast Cancer, BREASTCANCER (2019), https://www.breastcancer.org/symptoms/types/recur_metast/treat_metast/clinical-trials/expanded-accessand-right-to-try.
124. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 36, at 7–8.
125. Annalisa Merelli, Who Pays for the “Right to Try” Experimental Medicine?, QUARTZ
(May 30, 2018), https://qz.com/1292947/under-the-right-to-try-act-who-pays-probably-notinsurance.
126. Lisa Kearns & Alison Bateman-House, Who Stands to Benefit? Right to Try Law Provisions and Implications, 51 THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION & REG. SCI. 170, 171 (2017).
127. Id. at 172 (discussing Colorado, Connecticut, Oklahoma, and West Virginia).
128. Id.
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Currently, there have not been sufficient numbers of patients using the RTT pathway to render a description, much less a
prediction, about whether companies tend to charge or not for
such access. 129 Shortly after the passage of the federal Right to Try
Act, BrainStorm, a company developing a therapy for ALS called
NurOwn, announced that it was considering using the federal RTT
law to provide access to NurOwn, with cost recovery from patients
or other sources. 130 The estimated cost was approximately $300,000
for individual patients. 131 Ultimately, the company decided not to
provide NurOwn through RTT, with one exception: Matthew Bellina, a patient who lobbied for the federal RTT law and for whom
the bill is named, received NurOwn for free in early 2019. 132
Finally, there are novel approaches to facilitate funding of
EA and RTT access. For example, a new contract research organization called Access Hope (formerly Beacon of Hope) aims to facilitate “Right to Try programs, at scale, for the industry.” 133 The company has stated its intentions to provide a stem-cell based product
to patients in the future. 134 Access Hope charges individual patients
for the cost of an investigational product, while also charging the
drug company providing the drug a fee for collecting data from the
RTT program. 135 The effect on patient costs could be higher, lower,
or the same as if the sponsor handled the RTT request itself. Additionally, proposed model legislation in various states would require
any insurers that provide coverage and benefits for palliative care
129. See Arthur L. Caplan & Alison Bateman-House, Should Patients in Need Be Given Access to Experimental Drugs?, 16 EXPERT OPINION ON PHARMACOTHERAPY 1275, 1276 (2015).
130. Tova Cohen, Exclusive: BrainStorm Will Not Provide ALS Therapy Under U.S. Right to
Try Act, REUTERS (June 26, 2018, 7:39 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-healthbrainstorm-cell-als-exclusive/exclusive-brainstorm-will-not-provide-als-therapy-under-u-sright-to-try-act-idUSKBN1JM1BE.
131. Id.; see also Adam Feurstein, Here Comes the Right-to-try Profiteers. The FDA is Powerless
to Stop Them, STATNEWS (June 20, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/06/20/right-totry-opportunism.
132. Nicholas Florko, Prominent “Right to Try” Advocate is Getting Treatment Under the New
Law, STATNEWS (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/02/05/one-right-to-tryadvocate-is-getting-treatment-under-the-new-law.
133. Paul Knoepfler, Richard Garr Q&A on His New Right-To-Try Firm Beacon of Hope, THE
NICHE: KNOEPFLER LAB STEM CELL BLOG (Sept. 12, 2019), https://ipscell.com/2019/09/richard-garr-qa-on-right-to-try-firm-beacon-of-hope.
134. Beacon of Hope CRO Launches at ALS Association Florida Chapter’s Sixth Annual Hope
and Help Symposium, CISION PRNEWSWIRE (Sept. 12, 2019, 08:29 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/beacon-of-hope-cro-launches-at-als-association-florida-chapterssixth-annual-hope-and-help-symposium-300917009.html; Knoepfler, supra note 133.
135. Id.
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to provide coverage and benefits for investigational medical products on a basis no less favorable than that of palliative care or hospice. 136 As of this writing, no state legislature has adopted this legislation.

IV.

UNREGULATED SALES

For a variety of reasons, including a dissatisfaction with allopathic medicine, a perceived lack of approved treatment options,
or willingness to try any option available, very ill patients and their
families may wish to access medical interventions marketed and sold
outside of, or at the margins of, existing regulatory structures. 137
Such options include alternative medical therapies and modalities,
dietary supplements, and homeopathic and/or naturopathic remedies. 138 To access such treatments, patients may resort to “medical
tourism,” traveling to other locations (sometimes domestic but typically international) to access medical products or procedures that
are not locally available to them. 139 Regardless of where access occurs, these interventions are typically unproven; however, only
some are “investigational,” in terms of being rigorously studied for
efficacy and safety. 140 The FDA’s lax regulation of all these products
means that patients receive injections of various substances that
have no proof of safety, efficacy, or even that they contain what they
claim.
Stem cell treatments are an important example of this direct-to-consumer phenomenon. 141 Some stem cell treatments are
the subject of legitimate clinical trials and medical research. 142 On
136. The Abigail Alliance Patient Advoc. Comm., The Freedom of Treatment Act: Empowering Terminally-Ill Patients to Try Experimental Drugs and Therapies, THE ABIGAIL-ALLIANCE (Jan.
21, 2020), https://www.abigail-alliance.org/2020/01/freedom-of-treatment-act-empowering-patients.html.
137. Jeremy Snyder & Timothy Caulfield, Patients’ Crowdfunding Campaigns for Alternative Cancer Treatments, 20 THE LANCET 28, 28–9 (2019).
138. See Types of Complementary and Alternative Medicine, JOHNS HOPKINS MEDICINE,
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/wellness-and-prevention/types-of-complementary-and-alternative-medicine (last visited June 12, 2020).
139. See generally I. GLENN COHEN, PATIENTS WITH PASSPORTS: MEDICAL TOURISM, LAW,
AND ETHICS (2014).
140. See generally id.
141. See Geoffrey P. Lomax, Art Torres, & Maria T. Millan, Regulated, Reliable, and Reputable: Protect Patients with Uniform Standards for Stem Cell Treatments, 9 STEM CELLS
TRANSLATIONAL MED. 547, 547 (2020).
142. Id.
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the other hand, when heavily marketed as miracle treatments, unproven stem cell treatments can be a potential public health
threat. 143 Stem cell treatments can cause a multitude of serious adverse events. 144
In general, public and private payers do not cover these
products or services, which are neither recognized as medically necessary nor supported by an evidentiary basis. 145 Instead, patients
seeking to use these options must pay out-of-pocket. Some patients
turn to crowdfunding. There is some evidence to suggest that
crowdfunding campaigns are not funded equitably, and campaigners with greater perceived social media literacy tend to raise more
money on average than those without; additionally, white campaigners tend to raise more money on average than people of
color. 146
GoFundMe is the market leader in personal medical fundraising online, and its website states that it raises more than $650
million for over 250,000 medical campaigns per year. 147 According
to GoFundMe’s CEO, one in three of the website’s campaigns involve medical fundraising. 148 Many of these campaigns involve bona
fide medical interventions. 149 For example, in a world of uninsurance and underinsurance, patients and families may raise money to
pay large copays in the event of an emergency or to fund long-term
care. 150 Accordingly, scholars have found states that did not adopt
143. Laertis Ikonomou et al., Unproven Stem Cell Treatments for Lung Disease-An Emerging
Public Health Problem, 195 AM. J. RESPIRATORY CRITICAL CARE MED. 13, 13–14 (2017).
144. See Amy Zarzeczny et al., The Stem Cell Market and Policy Options: A Call for Clarity, 5
J. L. BIOSCIENCE 743, 744–5, 753 (2018).
145. See Liz Szabo, Why Expensive, Unproven Stem Cell Treatments are a New Health Care
Trend, PBS (Apr. 4, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/why-expensive-unproven-stem-cell-treatments-are-a-new-health-care-trend.
146. Lauren S. Berliner & Nora J. Kenworthy, Producing a Worthy Illness: Personal Crowdfunding Amidst Financial Crisis, 187 SOC. SCI. & MED. 233, 240 (2017).
147. Get
Help
With
Medical
Fundraising,
GOFUNDME,
https://www.gofundme.com/start/medical-fundraising (last visited June 12, 2020).
148. Mark Zdechlik, Go Fund My Doctor Bills: Americans Ask for Help Paying for Health Care,
MPR NEWS (July 2, 2018, 2:00 AM), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2018/07/02/healthcare-gofundme-crowdfunding-doctor-bills-minn.
149. Max Levy, Bioethics Experts Call on GoFundMe to Ban Unproven Medical Treatments,
THE VERGE (Dec. 9, 2019, 1:51 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/12/9/21002593/bioethics-gofundme-health-unproven-medical-treatments-illegal-operations.
150. Mark Zdechlik, Patients are Turning to GoFundMe to Fill health Insurance Gaps, NPR
(Dec.
27,
2018,
4:29
PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2018/12/27/633979867/patients-are-turning-to-gofundme-to-fill-health-insurancegaps.
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Medicaid expansion after the passage of the ACA held a higher
number of crowdfunding campaigns than those that did adopt the
expansion. 151
Frequently, however, people use crowdfunding to raise
money for scientifically unsupported and potentially dangerous
treatments. 152 Between November 2015 and December 2017, more
than one thousand medical crowdfunding campaigns raised more
than $6.7 million for a set of five treatments unsupported by scientific evidence: stem cells for brain injury, stem cells for spinal cord
injury, homeopathy/naturopathy for cancer, hyperbaric oxygen
therapy for brain injury, and long-term usage of antibiotics for
Lyme disease. 153 Another study investigating stem cell treatments
marketed by 351 United States-based companies found that 408
campaigns raised more than one million dollars for these direct-toconsumer interventions. 154 Unscrupulous health care providers
stand to reap significant financial reward from patient use of crowdfunding for treatments that at best are ineffective, and at worst potentially harmful.

V.

ETHICAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Individuals and families in the United States purchase
health insurance so that they can receive financial assistance for
medical costs. There is a widespread expectation that insurers will
cover the costs of medicines, items, and services that will cure or
treat illnesses with the goal of improving one’s quality of life. 155
Many Americans, however, find that their expectations surrounding
their coverage and what they can afford drastically shift when a patient or loved one becomes gravely ill. 156 In the absence or

151. Berliner & Kenworthy, supra note 146, at 237.
152. Ford Vox et al., Medical Crowdfunding for Scientifically Unsupported or Potentially Dangerous Treatments, 320 JAMA 1705, 1705-6 (2018); see also Jeremy Snyder & Leigh Turner,
Selling Stem Cell ‘Treatments’ as Research: Prospective Customer Perspectives from Crowdfunding Campaigns, 13 REGENERATIVE MED. 375, 379 (2018).
153. Vox et al., supra note 152, at 1705–6.
154. Jeremy Snyder et al., Crowdfunding for Unproven Stem Cell-Based Interventions, 319
JAMA 1935, 1935–6 (2018).
155. Jim Parker, Biologics and the Principles of Health Insurance, 9 BIOTECHNOLOGY
HEALTHCARE 14, 15 (2012).
156. Lisa McDermott, How Consumer Expectations Drive Change in Health Organizations,
CERNER (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.cerner.com/perspectives/consumer-expectationsare-driving-change-in-health-care-organizations.
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exhaustion of approved treatment options, seriously or terminally
ill patients are sometimes surprised or outraged that an insurer will
not cover a last resort investigational product that may provide benefit. 157 We offer both individual-level and population-level bioethics
policy analyses.

A. Individualized Bioethics
It is sometimes tempting for an insurer, sponsor, or policymaker—and indeed, the general public—to focus on a particular
patient’s request for an unapproved treatment rather than focusing
on broader policy questions. 158 Scholars refer to this perspectivetaking as one of “identified” lives rather than “statistical” lives, and
at least psychologically, such framing seems quite important. 159
Such a focus raises serious equity concerns in that objectively similar
requests may be treated differently based on how appealing an individual is perceived to be. Petitions for access often underscore factors about the requestor that would invoke sympathy, for example,
their age or the fact that they are newly married or a parent.
Access to an unapproved product may be framed as a form
of rescue for a desperate person in crisis or danger, like offering a
hand to a drowning child in a pond. Through this lens, the moral
obligation to help seems almost obvious. Of course, it is limited to
situations where there is medical feasibility, no obvious unacceptable risks, and a real chance of benefit to a patient. 160 Such a “rule of
rescue” 161 is the basic ethical justification that pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies employ when offering non-trial preapproval access of their investigational products. However, some companies may decline to grant this kind of access using the justification
that if they are unable to provide the product to all requestors, then
it is unfair to provide it only to some. Alternatively, small companies
may not offer this access if doing so would divert resources from

157. See Snyder & Turner, supra note 152, at 378.
158. I. GLENN COHEN ET AL., IDENTIFIED VERSUS STATISTICAL LIVES: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVE
1
(2015),
https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190217471.001.0001/acprof-9780190217471.
159. See generally id.
160. John McKie & Jeff Richardson, The Rule of Rescue, 56 SOC. SCI. MED. 2407, 2407–19
(2003).
161. Id. at 2407.
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clinical trials and cost them the necessary resources to gather data
for a regulatory submission. 162
Such morally salient perspectives can also impinge on companies’ rational interests. On the one hand, companies and executives may face costly public shaming if they choose not to provide a
product. 163 On the other hand, outside well-defined clinical trials,
the clinical risks of providing the investigational product are possibly greater, and adverse outcomes may cause negative publicity or
devastating financial losses to the company when those outcomes
are disclosed to investors. 164 There is widespread concern within industry that non-trial preapproval access related serious adverse
events will hinder the product’s progress to FDA approval; however,
the FDA has sought to assuage this concern. 165 In a world that depends on drug development by companies, these rational business
interests are not irrelevant to public health and ethics.
Even from this individual perspective, there are compelling
reasons to constrain coverage for unapproved treatments, aside
from the equity concerns raised above. These reasons arise from the
principles of non-maleficence and acceptable medical paternalism.
Just as insurers or sponsors are in a position to potentially help
those in dire need of rescue, they similarly have an obligation to
avoid complicity in harming patients who would access dangerous
products. 166 Indeed, the duty not to harm, particularly when there
is no compensatory benefit, is arguably stronger than the duty to
offer a potential benefit. How can sponsors or payers be confident
as to whether intervening will do more good than harm, when the
majority of investigational medical products ultimately fail? 167
The typical response to these sorts of concerns is to allow the
patient to decide for herself, whether the intervention is likely to be
162. See generally id. at 2417.
163. Kenneth I. Moch, Ethical Crossroads: Expanded Access, Patient Advocacy, and the
#SaveJosh Social Media Campaign, MED. ACCESS @ POINT OF CARE e119, e123 (2017),
https://doi.org/10.5301/maapoc.0000019.
164. Goldwater Inst., Dead on Arrival: Federal “Compassionate Use” Leaves Little Hope for
Dying Patients, RIGHTTOTRY (Feb. 24, 2016), https://righttotry.org/dead-on-arrival.
165. Food and Drug Administration, Expanded Access | Information for Industry,
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/expanded-access/expanded-access-information-industry#FDAPolicy (“FDA is not aware of instances in which adverse event information from
expanded access has prevented FDA from approving a drug.”)
166. Id. at 1275.
167. Gail A. Van Norman, Drugs, Devices, and the FDA: Part 1 An Overview of Approval
Processes for Drugs, 1 JACC: BASIC TO TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 170, 171 (2016).
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harmful or beneficial on net. However, where reliable information
is scant and the choice may be colored by desperation, mere deference to the patient’s wishes may be unreliable, for guiding the ethical decisions of others, such as companies and insurers. An analogous concern for clinical trials is the “therapeutic misconception,”
or the misunderstanding by some research participants that the primary purpose of a clinical trial is to treat them, when it is instead to
produce generalizable knowledge. 168
To the extent that individuals may have a moral right to access some investigational treatments, they also have a right to fair
procedures in determining the applicability of that right. 169 The decisions are both drug-focused and patient-focused. At the druglevel, private insurers and government health agencies have relied
on technology assessments summarizing the available evidence and
gaps in knowledge. 170 If an assessment reveals insufficient evidence
on which decisions can be made, insurers will often deny coverage
or require additional information. 171 Such assessments consume resources that might be better spent elsewhere. 172 By choosing not to
cover investigational therapies as a standard policy, other insurers
avoid these situations entirely. 173
At the individual level, Aetna and Kaiser Permanente have
devised a system for external reviews of requests for coverage of investigational therapies by independent medical consultants. 174 In
the event that they do not recommend coverage, beneficiaries can
appeal those decisions by requesting that a medical ombudsman
program, usually a panel of two to three experts who are not affiliated with the insurer, make a clinical assessment of the treatment
plan’s feasibility for an individual patient. 175 In 1996, California’s
legislature passed the Friedman-Knowles Experimental Treatment
Act, which mandated that all California insurers use a similar

168. Paul S. Appelbaum et al., The Therapeutic Misconception: Informed Consent in Psychiatric Research, 5 INT’L J. OF L. AND PSYCHIATRY 319 (1982).
169. See Caplan & Bateman-House, supra note 129, at 1278.
170. Mary Ader, Investigational Treatments: Coverage, Controversy, and Consensus, 5 ANN.
HEALTH L. 45, 49 (1996).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Norman Daniels & James E. Sabin, Last Chance Therapies and Managed Care Pluralism, Fair Procedures, and Legitimacy, 28 HASTINGS CEN. REP. 27, 31–32 (1998).
175. Id. at 33.
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independent consultation process for reviewing coverage denials. 176
These review processes aim to uphold the principle of procedural
justice by ensuring that patients are treated with transparency and
fairness when they inquire about or appeal these coverage decisions.

B. Population-Level Bioethics
The foregoing analyses do not answer several populationlevel questions. Under what, if any, circumstances should coverage
for preapproval access be further expanded? How can limits be set
fairly and how can access to unapproved treatments be rationalized
to plan members who are denied reimbursement of certain approved
medications? Several of these questions impinge on collective action problems.
Although rationing is sometimes considered a dirty word, it
is essential in any world of scarce resources. 177 In a world of scarcity,
public and private insurers must set reasonable limits on their coverage of items and services to control the costs of health insurance
premiums and/or taxes that support coverage in the first place. Allocation of the common pool resource that is health insurance is an
important collective action problem, which reflects divergent interests of individuals paying into the pool ex ante and individuals drawing from the pool ex post. 178
Given the paucity of evidence about their safety and efficacy,
unapproved products are precisely the category of healthcare expenditures that we can be least confident of securing commensurate value for each dollar spent. 179 As frustrating as it may be for a
desperate patient to be denied access to an unproven treatment, it
is also frustrating for millions of workers to have their real wages
depressed for decades as their incomes were instead shifted towards
health insurance premiums growing at multiples the rate of inflation. 180 Even worse, if insurance premiums are inflated by spending
176. Id. at 34.
177. Nir Eyal et al., Can Rationing Through Inconvenience Be Ethical?, 48 HASTINGS CEN.
REP. 10, 22 (2018).
178. Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL L. REV. 1451, 1459, 1484, 1525
(1994).
179. Christopher T. Robertson, The Presumption Against Expensive Health Care Consumption, 49 TULSA L. REV. 627, 636–37 (2014).
180. Darren Lubotsky & Craig A. Olson, Premium Copayments and the Trade-Off Between
Wages and Employer-Provided Health Insurance, 44 J. HEALTH ECON. 63, 64–67 (2015).
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on unproven treatments, some marginal consumers may be unable
to get insured at all. 181 Using scarce monies to incentivize preapproval access is problematic when many lack sufficient access to
proven basic care. Yet preapproval access to medical problems
comes in different forms, some of which it may be more justifiable
than others to incentivize. Thus, the question of paying for preapproval access is not a simple yes or no; rather, it is a question of
which expenses should be prioritized over which other potential expenditures.
These concerns explain why insurers have traditionally set
limits on spending, requiring “medical necessity” and excluding investigational treatments. 182 In routine practice, for approved products to be used on-label, medical necessity primarily entails that a
physician identify the treatment as appropriate care for his or her
patient, which reflects the teleological purpose of health insurance
in the first place. 183 For off-label or investigational treatments recommended by a treating physician, the justification for coverage is
more complicated. 184 The product may well prove to be the optimal
treatment; the evidence for that claim is just not yet available, or at
least has not yet decisively been reviewed by the FDA, which was
created for that purpose. 185
Nonetheless, it is difficult to enforce even reasonable limits.
For example, in the 1990s, high-dose chemotherapy followed by autologous bone marrow transplantation (“HDC-ABMT”) was a treatment for breast cancer, even though it had a weak evidence base. 186
In response to patient protests and some litigation, many plans
agreed to cover the treatment. 187 With the treatment available via
insurance, patients desiring it did not have incentive to participate
in clinical trials of the intervention, and so the development of

181. E. Richard Brown, Problems of Health Insurance Coverage and Health Care in the United
States: Public and Private Solution Strategies, 8 CAD. SAÚDE PÚBL., RIO DE JANEIRO 270, 271,
276–78 (1992).
182. Mark A. Hall & Gerald F. Anderson, Health Insurers’ Assessment of Medical Necessity,
140 PENN. L. REV. 1637, 1645–46 (1992).
183. Id. at 1647.
184. See id. at 1677, 1682.
185. See id. at 1665.
186. Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, The Controversy Over High-Dose Chemotherapy with Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant for Breast Cancer, 20 HEALTH AFF. 101, 101–02
(2001).
187. Ader, supra note 170, at 50–51, 56.
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evidence was delayed. 188 Yet upon completion of these trials, five
major randomized clinical trials did not show HDC-ABMT to be effective over standard-dose treatment, and the procedure was ultimately repudiated as ineffective and associated with faster time to
death. 189 That episode caused insurance companies to outline
clearer policies surrounding coverage of investigational treatments,
often limiting them to the confines of clinical trials. 190
More recently, when courts have addressed such coverage
disputes, decisions are often in favor of patients suing for coverage. 191 For example, in 2018, an Oklahoma jury awarded $25.5 million in damages for bad faith insurance denial in a case where a
cancer patient sought proton beam therapy, which Aetna determined was investigational or experimental for the patient’s specific
disease. 192
Broad insurance coverage of investigational therapies has
additional implications for population health. One issue is the collective action problem in the generation of knowledge about safety
and efficacy. 193 The generation of knowledge requires investment
(typically by companies) in the costs of performing clinical trials,
and it requires humans willing to participate in those trials. 194 Accordingly, regulations prohibit companies from profiting from clinical trials, EA, and RTT; such profits would sap their incentive to
complete the trials necessary to enter the market broadly. 195 While
using scarce monies on unapproved medical products is problematic when many lack sufficient access to proven basic care, such expenditures are justifiable if the investigational products are used in
such a way to generate societally-beneficial findings. Insurance coverage for investigational therapies given to patients within the context of a clinical trial ensures a sufficient number of individuals willing to participate in studies that evaluate the safety and effectiveness
188. Id. at 50.
189. Mello & Brennan, supra note 186, at 102.
190. Ader, supra note 170, at 48, 54.
191. Id. at 54; Mello & Brennan, supra note 186, at 113.
192. Wayne Drash, Jury Delivers $25.5 million “Statement” to Aetna to Change its Ways, CNN
(Nov. 10, 2018, 4:03 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/10/health/aetna-verdict-oklahoma-orrana-cunningham/index.html.
193. Robertson, supra note 7, at 562, 565.
194. Ahmad W & Moeen Al-Sayed, Human Subjects in Clinical Trials: Ethical Considerations
and Concerns, 4 J. TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 1, 1–3 (2018).
195. Christopher T. Robertson, The Tip of the Iceberg: A First Amendment Right to Promote
Drugs Off-Label, 78 OHIO ST. L. J. 1019, 1020 (2017).
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of new medical products which could eventually reach the larger
patient population. Relatedly, insurance coverage of patient uses of
investigational therapies, particularly in the context of clinical trials, can be a form of subsidy for drug innovation. 196 Smaller innovative companies may fail prior to reaching full market approval. If
costs can be offset to insurers, or even recouped through revenues,
then such companies may be more sustainable. 197 Of course, the
challenge becomes picking winners and losers; it is not clear which
companies should or should not be subsidized as such.
Even outside of trials, insurers could participate in generating real-world evidence from therapeutic attempts using investigational products. 198 The FDA defines real-world evidence as “clinical
evidence regarding the usage and potential benefits or risks of a
medical product derived from analysis of [real-world data].” 199 Realworld data is generally considered to be any source of data outside
that collected in a traditional, randomized clinical trial. 200 Real
world evidence can support label expansions, particularly when the
relevant data comes from EA programs, as these may allow sponsors
to gather valuable safety and efficacy information about investigational treatments in patients who are different from those in the
trial population. 201 Thus, insurers can support innovation while simultaneously participating in generating evidence that aids in their
process of determining which products should be added to their
formularies. Nonetheless, the collection of real world data from EA
runs the risk of blurring the previously sacrosanct division of research and treatment and raising challenges concerning appropriate oversight.
There are also important equity concerns. If an individual
insurer, whether it be government-run or private, decides to cover
196. See Shailin Thomas & Arthur Caplan, Incentivizing Therapies for Rare Diseases—Reply,
322 JAMA 465 (2019).
197. Reed Abelson, Cost, Not Choice, is Top Concern of Health Insurance Customers, THE N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/13/business/cost-not-choiceis-top-concern-of-health-insurance-customers.html.
198. Real-World Evidence, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 5, 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/science-research/science-and-research-special-topics/real-world-evidence; Report on Leveraging Real-World Treatment Experience from Expanded Access Protocols,
REAGAN UDALL FDN., https://navigator.reaganudall.org/resources/report-leveraging-realworld-treatment-experience-expanded-access-protocols.
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
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an investigational therapy based on a particular case determination
or documented unmet medical need, it must do so in generalizable
fashion, treating like cases alike. 202 It should ensure that all patients,
regardless of their socioeconomic status, can afford to access this
therapy in a clinical trial or through a non-trial pathway. This consideration impinges upon broader social questions of underinsurance, but it is necessary here to recognize the irony of the foregoing
ethical rationales for possibly expanding insurance coverage if done
in a way that does not guarantee equitable access. 203

C. Looking Ahead
Given the foregoing ethical and policy concerns, we suggest
a few ways forward. The goal is to provide a reasonable degree of
access to promising unapproved treatments, with equity and transparency.
The most obvious and pressing opportunity for reform is in
the particular context of clinical trials, where the lack of Medicaid
coverage for participation costs in many states precludes many lowincome patients from accessing potentially beneficial therapies in a
clinical trial. 204 Similarly, Medicare should be reformed to place a
cap on out-of-pocket expenses for patients in clinical trials (as well
as for healthcare more generally). The Medicaid exclusion and uncapped Medicare out-of-pocket exposure not only undermine access but constrict the diversity of clinical trial participants, and thus,
the external validity of trial results. This problem has negative ramifications not only for patients who are unable to participate in clinical trials that they would otherwise want to enroll into, but also for
society, as new treatments are developed through the clinical trials
conducted on such individual volunteers.
Beyond clinical trials, some have suggested changes to Medicaid and Medicare statutes that allow for reimbursement for investigational therapies. 205 Given the challenge of allocating scarce

202. Ader, supra note 170, at 51.
203. ROBERTSON, supra note 21, at 83.
204. Guidance for Industry, supra note 36, at 3.
205. Michael Cipriano, Right to Try Conversation Should be Redirected Toward Reimbursement
of Unapproved Drugs, Experts Say, PINK SHEET (Jan. 29, 2019), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS124659/Right-To-Try-Conversation-Should-Be-Redirected-TowardReimbursement-Of-Unapproved-Drugs-Experts-Say.
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resources, this approach presents extremely difficult line-drawing
problems.
A more modest approach would be to create new federal tax
subsidies to companies, perhaps targeting smaller biotechnology
companies in particular, to support their capability to create EA
programs where they believe the evidence and medical need justify
such. This approach avoids the two perils of allowing broad insurance coverage of unproven treatments and allowing companies to
profit from unapproved treatments. This approach facilitates the
creation of EA programs while keeping companies focused on proving safety and efficacy for broad market access, when insurance reimbursement would be appropriate.
There has also been a suggestion that sponsors develop
early-stage conversations with payers so that reimbursement is “preapproved.” 206 Others have suggested allowing companies to profit
from preapproval sales, but then placing the profits in interest-bearing escrow accounts. 207 If the drug is not approved as safe and effective for the patient’s indication, then insurers can claw back the
profits. 208 If it is approved, they are released. 209 One such mechanism under Congressional consideration is the Conditional Approval Act, which would create a new pathway to FDA approval, similar to the current accelerated approval pathway. 210 Conditional
approval would be provisional and would be automatically revoked
if follow-up trials supplying sufficient proof of safety and efficacy are
not conducted within a set time period. 211 As companies would be
able to sell their conditionally-approved medical product for a
profit, they would have an incentive to make it widely available, unlike with clinical trials or non-trial preapproval access. 212 As an approved product, public and private payers could choose to cover the
product’s costs, something they are very unlikely to do for products

206. Pitts, supra note 115.
207. Benjamin P. Falit & Cary P. Gross, Access to Experimental Drugs for Terminally Ill Patients, 300 JAMA 2793, 2794 (2008).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. S. 3133, 116th Cong. (2019).
211. Id.
212. See generally Advancing the Development of Medical Products Used in the Prevention, Diagnosis, And Treatment of Neglected Tropical Diseases: Hearing before the FDA, 111th Cong. (2010)
(statement of Leonard Sacks, Acting Director, Office of Critical Path Programs).
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provided via non-trial preapproval access. 213 However, simply because payers could choose to pay does not mean that they necessarily would do so. A further complication is that the company
would be obliged to continue clinical trials of the product, yet its
commercial availability could negatively impact enrollment. 214 Such
post-approval trials have already proven difficult for companies to
complete. 215

VI.

CONCLUSION

Disparities in access may result when costs for access to investigational medical products fall solely, or even largely, on individuals. Ultimately, public and private insurers are justified in setting limits on coverage for investigational products. Using scarce
monies on unapproved medical products of unknown worth is
problematic when many lack sufficient access to proven basic care
and inflated premiums cause other welfare tradeoffs. However, it is
laudable to try to offer rescue in cases of last resort, particularly
when this can be accomplished in ways that generate societally-useful data, e.g., clinical trials and real world evidence-generating expanded access programs.
Thus, Congress should consider mechanisms that encourage the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry to cover the
costs associated with clinical trials, including extending Medicaid
and Medicare coverage of non-investigational product costs ancillary to preapproval access. Secondarily, non-trial pathways may warrant additional support, but these reforms must keep in mind the
fundamental roles and incentives of innovating companies to prove
safety and efficacy and of insurers to limit coverage to interventions
with proven value. Finally, such reforms must be carried out in ways
that avoid negative impacts on patient access to approved treatments or other evidence-based medical interventions.

213. Working Group on Compassionate Use & Preapproval Access Frequently Asked Questions,
NYU LANGONE HEALTH, https://med.nyu.edu/departments-institutes/populationhealth/divisions-sections-centers/medical-ethics/research/working-group-compassionateuse-preapproval-access/frequently-asked-questions#who-pays-for-preapproval-access-drugs
(last visited May 31, 2020).
214. S. 3133.
215. Steven Woloshin et al., The Fate of FDA Postapproval Studies, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1114 (2017).

